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Abstract
Let us consider that somebody is extremely interested in increasing the prob-
ability of a proposal to be approved by a certain committee and let us assume
that for achieving this goal he/she is prepared to pay o one member of the
committee. In a situation like this one, and assuming that vote-buying is al-
lowed and free of stigma, which voter should be oered a bribe? The potential
decisiveness index for simple games, which measures the eect that ensuring
one positive vote produces in the probability to pass the issue at hand, is a
good tool to get the answer. An axiomatic characterization of this index is
given in this paper, and its relation to other classical power indices is showed.
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1 Introduction
Assume that a proposal has to be submitted to a nite set of voters, that each voter
has an independent a priori probability of voting in favor of the proposal and that
some voting rules are established for deciding if the proposal will either be accepted
or rejected after the votes are cast.
Suppose now that an external inuence is able to increase till 1 the probability
of a voter for accepting the proposal. Of course, if this happens, and this voter
has even a small inuence in the nal result, the probability for the proposal being
approved will increase. The amount of this increasing eect is obviously not the
same for all of the voters. It depends on how crucial is his/her vote and it also
depends on his/her initial probability to vote for the proposal.
A new index 
 for measuring potential decisiveness of voters in this context
was introduced in [22], and it was proved that ensuring the favorable vote of the
voter with maximum 
{measure is the way to obtain the greatest increment in the
probability of getting the proposal approved.
Example 1.1 Assume that a jury has to take a decision on a case. For purposes
of the example, we will suppose there are 4 jurors, one of whom is the president of
the jury. Each juror will vote for either conviction or acquittal and the outcome of
the vote will be the majority decision of the jury. Because ties are possible, these
will be resolved by the casting vote of the president, i.e., the president plays the
role of tiebreaker in the jury. Assume further that an external person, who is very
interested in the verdict of the trial, estimates that the president will vote for acquittal
with probability 1   p, while the other 3 jurors will vote for acquittal with an equal
probability p. If the outsider considers the possibility of bribing one of the jurors to
ensure his/her vote for acquittal with probability 1, which one of the jurors would
he/she rather select to be oered the bribe: the president or any of the other three
jurors?
Some results in [23] allow us to select a list of voters to be persuaded, given
any particular ranking of their predictions, and this procedure, which can be easily
implemented in a computer, can be applied in an analogous way to select a list of
voters to be bribed, i.e. voters with maximum value for the 
{measure. We refer
to these two papers for more examples about the applicability of the 
{measure.
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The usual model for a voting scenario like the one described is a simple game,
that is to say, a pair (N;W), where N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng denotes the set of voters, and
W is the set of winning coalitions, i.e., sets of voters whose favorable vote ensures
the acceptation of the proposal. Subsets of N that are not in W are called losing
coalitions, and it is assumed that: 1) ; is losing; 2) subsets of losing coalitions are
again losing (monotonicity). It is assumed that W 6= ;, so that N is always a
winning coalition. A winning coalition is minimal if each proper subset is a losing
coalition. The set of minimal winning coalitions is usually denoted by Wm, and,
because of monotonicity, it completely determines the game. Given S  N , S 6= ;,
the S{unanimity game (N;US) is the game which has S as the unique minimal
winning coalition. If S = N the game (N;UN) is just called the unanimity game. A
voter i 2 N is null in (N;W) if i does not belong to any minimal winning coalition,
and it is a vetoer if it belongs to all of them. It is clear that in the S{unanimity
game (N;US) all voters in N n S are null and all voters in S are vetoers.
Classically, the only elements which are taken into account to dene the power
of a particular voter i are the set N of all voters and the voting rule, dened by the
set W of winning coalitions. The denitions of power indices try to reect dierent
aspects of power. Most of them rely on the idea of measuring decisiveness (see [33]
[29], [34], [5], [14] or [15] among others), but other aspects like success have also been
used ([31], [18], [9], [7], [8], [35], [24]). There exist another approach, which we call
the contextual approach, that takes into account, to measure the power of a voter i,
not only the elements N and W but also a probability distribution p over the vote
congurations that can emerge. This contextual framework was introduced, as far
as we know, by Laruelle and Valenciano ([26]), although some authors had already
considered this kind of power indices before, with dierent probability distributions
([18], [35]). When independence of voter's votes is assumed then the probability
distribution p over the vote congurations is completely determined by the proba-
bilities vector p = (p1; : : : ; pn) 2 [0; 1]n, where pi is the a priori probability of each
voter i for voting in favor of the proposal.
Either in the classical approach or in the contextual one, a power index can
also be dened by a set of properties which uniquely characterize it. This has been
done for most of the classical indices, in particular the rst axiomatization of the
Shapley{Shubik index on simple games was given in [17] and the rst one for the
Banzhaf index in [18] (dierent alternative axiomatizations have been proposed, see
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for example [32], [19]). In the contextual approach, a decisiveness index, which
extends the Banzhaf index, was proposed in [18] and axiomatized in [10], dierent
success indices were introduced in [26] and axiomatized in [2], and the potential
decisiveness index was introduced in [22] and an axiomatization for it is presented
in this work.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the denition and the motivation
of the potential decisiveness are recalled. An axiomatic characterization for this
measure is established in Section 3, and the independence of the axioms is proved.
Section 4 is devoted to relate this index with the classical Banzhaf and Shapley{
Shubik indices, and Section 5 summarizes the contents of the paper and points out
some future questions to work on.
2 The 
 measure of potential decisiveness
Let (N;W) be a simple game, where N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng denotes the set of voters (we
assume that n  2) andW is the set of winning coalitions. Assume that each voter's
vote is independent of the others' and let pi be the a priori probability of voter i
for voting in favor of the proposal. Our contextual model is a triple (N;W ;p),
where (N;W) is the simple game and p = (p1; : : : ; pn) 2 [0; 1]n is the probabilities
vector. In [10] and [11], this triple is called assessed simple game and we also use
this nomenclature in this paper. The set of all assessed simple games is denoted by
ASG.
Under the assumption of independence of voter's votes, the probability for a
proposal being accepted in (N;W ;p) is given by
f(N;W ;p) =
X
S2W
Y
i2S
pi
Y
i=2S
(1  pi): (1)
The function f is the multilinear extension (MLE) of the simple game (N;W)
which was introduced by Owen in [28] in the general context of cooperative games.
The MLE of a simple game is a polynomial function. Thus, it is continuous in its
domain [0; 1]n and dierentiable in (0; 1)n. It veries two types of monotonicity
properties:
 f(N;W ;p)  f(N;W 0;p) if W W 0,
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 f(N;W ;p)  f(N;W ;p0) if p  p0 (componentwise).
We will use f(p) instead of f(N;W ;p) whenever there is no possible misunder-
standing.
The increment on the probability f(p) due to an increment pi on pi is:
if(p) = f(p+i(p))  f(p) = fi(p)pi (2)
where i(p) = (0; : : : ; 0;pi; 0; : : : ; 0), and fi stands for the partial derivative of f
with respect to the component i, which is non-negative.
Note that if(p) depends on fi(p) but also on the values pi that is possible to
achieve. Indeed, it is obvious that if pi = 1 no increase of this probability is possible,
while if pi = 0 we can think of an increase pi = 1. So the potential decisiveness
importance of a voter i depends on two factors: the rate of change fi(p) and the a
priori probability pi. This is the motivation given in [22] for dening the index 
 in
the following way:
Denition 2.1 The potential decisiveness index 
 is the map that assigns to every
(N;W ;p) 2 ASG a vector 
(N;W ;p) 2 [0; 1]n dened by:

i(N;W ;p) = (1  pi)fi(p):
The function 
 is, for any xed game (N;W), a continuous function on [0; 1]n, dif-
ferentiable of any order in its interior (0; 1)n. From (2) it is clear that 
i(N;W ;p) =
f(1i;p)  f(p), where f(1i;p) denotes the value of f on the vector (1i;p) obtained
from p by replacing pi with 1. Thus, this index gives precisely the increment of
f(p) obtained by only changing the i{component of p from pi to 1. Corollary 3.3
in [22] shows that 0  
i(N;W ;p)  1, where 0 is only achieved for null voters or
for any other voter with pi = 1 (i.e., pure yes{voters), whereas 1 is only achieved
for a dictator being a pure no-voter (i.e., Wm = ffigg and pi = 0).
As the dierence f(1i;p) f(p) or, equivalently, 
i(N;W ;p) equals the increase
of probability for the issue at hand to be passed when only voter i changes his/her
vote from pi to 1, 
 is the most natural measure, from the probabilistic point of view,
for bribes or vote buying in the context of assessed simple games, when the alleged
briber is interested in approving the proposal. Once stated that this observation in
terms of probability is the main support to this measure, we additionally propose
in this paper a rst axiomatic characterization for it. Thus, from the results of this
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paper, the index 
 has support from both approaches, probabilistic and axiomatic.
Needless to say that nding other axiomatizations for 
 is an open issue.
This twofold characterization is a natural procedure for the justication of well
known power indices in simple games. For instance, either the Banzhaf or the
two Coleman's power indices admit several axiomatic characterizations but also a
probabilistic interpretation, see e.g. [27]. We also refer the interested reader to [22]
and [23] for additional theoretical information about 
, which, as far as we know,
is the only tool expressly introduced to measure the potential decisiveness of voters
in the context of assessed simple games.
Note that if the alleged briber was interested in defeating the proposal (instead
of approving it) then the dierence f(p) f(0i;p) would be the appropriate measure
because it gives the increase of probability, in absolute value, for the issue at hand
to be defeated when only voter i changes his/her vote from pi to 0. In this last
expression, f(0i;p) denotes the value of f on the vector (0i;p) obtained from p by
replacing pi with 0. This measure for assessed simple games is somehow analogous to

 because, by applying (2) with i(p) = (0; : : : ; 0; pi; 0; : : : ; 0), we obtain f(p) 
f(0i;p) = pifi(p).
Before continuing with the axiomatic characterization let us return to Exam-
ple 1.1.
Example 2.2 (Example 1.1 revisited)
For the voting system in Example 1.1, we have N = f1; 2; 3; 4g, where 1 denotes
the president,
W = ff1; 2g; f1; 3g; f1; 4g; f1; 2; 3g; f1; 2; 4g; f1; 3; 4g; f2; 3; 4g; f1; 2; 3; 4gg:1
For this game, expression (1) gives:
f(p) = p1p2 + p1p3 + p1p4   p1p2p3   p1p2p4   p1p3p4 + p2p3p4:
Thus, the partial derivatives are:
f1(p) = p2 + p3 + p4   p2p3   p2p4   p3p4; f2(p) = p1   p1p3   p1p4 + p3p4;
f3(p) = p1   p1p2   p1p4 + p2p4; f4(p) = p1   p1p2   p1p3 + p2p3:
Let us consider now the particular value of p = (1   p; p; p; p) for some 0 < p < 1.
For this probability vector we have: f1(p) = 3p(1  p) and f2(p) = f3(p) = f4(p) =
1This game can also be represented by the weighted game with representation [3; 2; 1; 1; 1].
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1 3p+3p2: Thus, we can compare the potential decisiveness index of the president,
i.e., player 1, with the potential decisiveness index of any other juror. Without loss
of generality we take player 4:

1(N;W ;p) = (1  p1)f1(p) = 3p2(1  p);

4(N;W ;p) = (1  p4)f4(p) = 1  4p+ 6p2   3p3:
Thus, 
1(N;W ;p)  
4(N;W ;p) =  3p2 + 4p  1 and

1(N;W ;p)  
4(N;W ;p) > 0 , p 2 (1=3; 1);

1(N;W ;p)  
4(N;W ;p) < 0 , p 2 (0; 1=3):
Hence, according to the potential decisiveness index, the president of the juror is the
best candidate to be bribed in (N;W ;p) if p > 1=3, while for p < 1=3 any other juror
should be chosen as a candidate to be bribed. Note also that the maximum dierence
in the interval (1=3; 1) is achieved for p = 2=3.
We remark that computing the MLE of a simple game is a complex task when the
number of variables involved is high. Some bounds are obtained in [20], and various
computation methods can be found, in another context, in [6] and [25].
From now on we restrict our work in proving some properties for the 
 measure,
and in giving an axiomatic characterization of it.
3 Axiomatic characterization of the 
 measure
In this section we establish some mathematical properties of the 
 measure and use
them to give an axiomatic characterization of it. These properties are consequence
of some characteristics of the MLE of a simple game that we collect in the following
lemma. The rst part will be used in the axiomatization of this index, while the
second part is basic for establishing the relationship of the 
 measure with the
Shapley-Shubik index.
Lemma 3.1 Let (N;W ;p) be an assessed simple game and f(N;W ;p) its MLE as
dened in (1).
(a) If (N;fW ;p) is another assessed simple game, then
f(N;W [ fW ;p) + f(N;W \ fW ;p) = f(N;W ;p) + f(N;fW ;p):
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(b) If  : N ! N is a permutation on N , then f(N; (W);p) = f(N;W ; (p)),
where (W) = f(S) j S 2 Wg and, (p) = (p(1); : : : ; p(n)).
Proof:
(a) For any subset A of 2N we dene
f(N;A;p) =
X
S2A
Y
i2S
pi
Y
i=2S
(1  pi):
If (N;A) is a simple game then f is its MLE as dened in (1). It is also clear that if
fW1;W2g is a partition of W then f(N;W ;p) = f(N;W1;p) + f(N;W2;p). Thus,
f(N;W [ fW ;p) = f(N;W n fW ;p) + f(N;fW nW ;p) + f(N;W \ fW ;p)
= f(N;W ;p) f(N;W \ fW ;p)+f(N;fW ;p) f(N;W \ fW ;p)+f(N;W \ fW ;p)
= f(N;W ;p) + f(N;fW ;p)  f(N;W \ fW ;p):
(b) From (1) we can write
f(N; (W);p) = P
S2(W)
Q
k2S
pk
Q
k=2S
(1  pk) =
P
 1(S)2W
Q
k2S
pk
Q
k=2S
(1  pk)
=
P
S2W
Q
k2(S)
pk
Q
k=2(S)
(1  pk) =
P
S2W
Q
 1(k)2S
pk
Q
 1(k)=2S
(1  pk)
= f(N;W ; (p))

In the following theorem, four basic properties of the potential decisiveness index

 are established. We will prove later that these axioms completely characterize this
index. In the following denition we introduce some new concepts needed to enounce
the theorem.
Denition 3.2
Let i 2 N and N i = N n fig. The new game (N i;W i) is dened by
S 2 W i if and only if S  N i and S [ fig 2 W
The game (N i;W i) is the reduced game of (N;W) determined by N n fig as
dened in [36]. The notation we use is borrowed from [10].
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Theorem 3.3 Let (N;W ;p) 2 ASG and 
 be the potential decisiveness index.
(A1) Null voter property: If j is null in (N;W) then 
j(N;W ;p) = 0.
(A2) External null voter property. If j is null in (N;W) then

i(N;W ;p) = 
i(N j;W j;p j)
for any i 2 N (i 6= j), where the jth component of p has been deleted in p j.
(A3) Transfer property: If (N;fW) is another simple game, then

(N;W [ fW ;p) + 
(N;W \ fW ;p) = 
(N;W ;p) + 
(N;fW ;p):
(A4) Unanimity property: If (N;UN) is the unanimity game then

i(N;UN ;p) = (1  pi)
Y
k2N
k 6=i
pk
for all i 2 N:
Proof:
We start by proving that if j is null in (N;W), then f(N;W ;p) = f(N j;W j;p j).
If j is null in (N;W) then it can not belong to any minimal winning coalition, so
that S 2 W and j 2 S implies that S n fjg 2 W . Thus, we can write:
f(N;W ;p) = P
S2W
j =2S
Q
k2S
pk
Q
k=2S
(1  pk) +
P
S2W
j2S
Q
k2S
pk
Q
k=2S
(1  pk)
= (1  pj)
P
S2W
j =2S
Q
k2S
pk
Q
k=2S
k 6=j
(1  pk) + pj
P
S2W
j =2S
Q
k2S
pk
Q
k=2S
k 6=j
(1  pk)
=
P
S2W
j =2S
Q
k2S
pk
Q
k=2S
k 6=j
(1  pk) =
P
S2W j
Q
k2S
pk
Q
k=2S
(1  pk)
= f(N j;W j;p j):
(3)
(A1) If j is null in (N;W) then, from (3), it is clear that pj does not appear in the
expression of f(N;W ;p) so that its corresponding partial derivative fj(N;W ;p) =
0. Thus 
j(N;W ;p) = 0.
(A2) If j is null in (N;W), then, from (3), f(N;W ;p) = f(N j;W j;p j), and
therefore their respective partial derivatives with respect to any component i 6= j
coincide. Thus, 
i(N;W ;p) = 
i(N j;W j;p j) for any i 6= j.
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(A3) From Lemma 3.1-(a) it is f(N;W [ fW ;p)+f(N;W \ fW ;p) = f(N;W ;p)+
f(N;fW ;p). Thus, for any i 2 N , it is fi(N;W [ fW ;p) + fi(N;W \ fW ;p) =
fi(N;W ;p) + fi(N;fW ;p). By multiplying all addends by 1  pi we get the result.
(A4) If (N;UN) is the unanimity game then f(N;UN ;p) =
Q
k2N
pk. Thus, for any
i 2 N it is fi(N;UN ;p) =
Q
k2N
k 6=i
pk. By multiplying this expressions by 1   pi we get
the result.

Some comments are in order about the properties stated in Theorem 3.3. The
rst two properties refer both to null voters, but with dierent perspectives: while
the rst one reports that these voters have no capacity of inuence on the nal
result, the second one emphasizes that neither the adjunction nor the suppression
of one or more null voters will aect the potential decisiveness of the rest of vot-
ers. The two properties are proved to be independent in Remark 3.5 (i) and (ii).
The transfer property ensures that the aggregate potential decisiveness arising from
(N;W) and (N;fW) is exactly transferred to (i.e., shared among) games (N;W [ fW)
and (N;W \ fW). Analogues of the transfer property were introduced in [17] to ax-
iomatize the Shapley{Shubik index (see also [32]), and were also used in [18], [19]
and others to characterize the Banzhaf value. Finally, the unanimity property can
be viewed as giving the \initial condition" to the potential decisiveness index.
Properties A1, A2, A3 and A4 of Theorem 3.3 characterize the 
 measure:
Theorem 3.4 A function 
 : ASG ! Rn satises properties A1, A2, A3 and A4
if and only if it is the potential decisiveness index.
Proof:
(a) (Existence) As is shown in Theorem 3.3, the potential decisiveness index
satises A1, A2, A3 and A4.
(b) (Uniqueness) Let 
0 be a function satisfying these four properties. Given N
we will start by proving that for any S  N and any p 2 [0; 1]n it is 
0i(N;US;p) =

i(N;US;p) for any i 2 N .
If i =2 S this equality is satised because of axiom A1, since i is null in (N;US)
and both terms are zero. Let us assume that i 2 S. By applying A4 we have
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that 
0i(S;US;p NnS) = (1   pi)
Q
k2S
k 6=i
pk. Now, let k =2 S and T = S [ fkg. Since
k is null in the game (T;US), then, applying A2, we can write 
0i(T;US;p NnT ) =

0i(S;US;p NnS). The recursive application of this reasoning for all elements not in
S allows us to conclude that 
0i(N;US;p) = 
0i(S;US;p NnS). Thus, 
0i(N;US;p) =
(1  pi)
Q
k2S
k 6=i
pk and this is precisely the value of 
i(N;US;p).
Now, if (N;W ;p) is an assessed simple game and Wm = fS1; S2; : : : ; Stg then
W = US1 [ US2 [    [ USt and, applying recursively A3,

0(N;[ti=1USi ;p) =
tX
j=1
( 1)j+1
X
1i1<<ijt

0(N;USi1 \ USi2 \    \ USij ;p):
Finally, taking into account
USi1 \ USi2 \    \ USik = USi1[Si2[[Sik
we get 
0(N;W ;p) = 
(N;W ;p).

The following examples prove the independence of this axiomatic system.
Remark 3.5 (Independence of the axiomatic system)
(i) The index  dened by
i(N;W ;p) =
(
(1  pi)fi(p) if i is not null in (N;W)
1 if i is null in (N;W)
satises A2, A3 and A4 but not A1.
(ii) The index  dened by
i(N;W ;p) =
8<: (1  pi)
Q
k 6=i
pk if i is not null in (N;W)
0 if i is null in (N;W)
satises A1, A3 and A4 but not A2.
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(iii) The index  dened by
i(N;W ;p) =
8><>:
(1  pi)
Q
k 6=i
k vetoer
pk if i is not null in (N;W)
0 if i is null in (N;W)
satises A1, A2 and A4 but not A3.
(iv) The index  = 2
 satises A1, A2 and A3 but not A4.
4 Relationship with standard power indices
In this section we will see that the potential decisiveness index 
 is related to some
well-known power indices.
Let us start with the Shapley-Shubik power index. In the following theorem we
recall the axiomatic characterization of this value  on simple games established by
Dubey in [17] and reformulated in [18]. The set of all simple games is denoted by
SG.
Theorem 4.1 A function  : SG ! Rn is the Shapley-Shubik power index if and
only if it satises the following properties for any (N;W) 2 SG:
(S1) If i is a null voter in (N;W) then i(N;W) = 0.
(S2)
nP
i=1
i(N;W) = 1.
(S3) If  : N ! N is a permutation on N , then i(N;W) = (i)(N; (W)), where
(W) = f(S) j S 2 Wg.
(S4) If (N;fW) 2 SG then:
(N;W [ fW) + (N;W \ fW) = (N;W) + (N;fW):
It is known (see Owen [28]) that the Shapley-Shubik power index of a simple
game (N;W) can be expressed in terms of its MLE f by
i(N;W) =
Z 1
0
fi(N;W ; t)dt (4)
where t = (t; : : : ; t). The following theorem shows that this index can also be
expressed in terms of the decisiveness index 
.
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Theorem 4.2 The Shapley-Shubik power index of a simple game (N;W) can be
expressed, for any i 2 N , as
i(N;W) =
R 1
0

i(N;W ; t)dtR 1
0
f(N;W ; t)dt
where t = (t; : : : ; t).
Proof:
Let bi(N;W) = R 10 
i(N;W ; t)dtR 1
0
f(N;W ; t)dt , for any i 2 N .
bi(N;W) is well-dened since
f(N;W ; t)  f(N;UN ; t) = tn for all game (N;W), therefore we haveZ 1
0
f(N;W ; t) dt  1
n+ 1
> 0:
We will prove that b veries: (S1), (S2), (S3) and (S4).
(S1 ) is an obvious consequence of Theorem 3.3-(A1). To prove (S2 ) we can write
from Denition 2.1 that
X
i2N
bi(N;W) =
P
i2N
R 1
0
(1  t)fi(N;W ; t)dtR 1
0
f(N;W ; t)dt =
P
i2N
R 1
0
fi(N;W ; t)dt 
P
i2N
R 1
0
tfi(N;W ; t)dtR 1
0
f(N;W ; t)dt :
Note now that X
i2N
Z 1
0
tfi(N;W ; t)dt =
Z 1
0
t
X
i2N
fi(N;W ; t)dt
and, integrating by parts, taking into account that d
dt
f(N;W ; t) = P
i2N
fi(N;W ; t),
we get Z 1
0
t
X
i2N
fi(N;W ; t)dt = tf(N;W ; t)]10  
Z 1
0
f(N;W ; t)dt:
Then, using (4) and Theorem 4.1(S2) we have
X
i2N
bi(N;W) =
P
i2N
i(N;W)  (1 
R 1
0
f(N;W ; t)dt)R 1
0
f(N;W ; t)dt = 1:
To prove property (S3) it is enough to verify the case of  being a transposi-
tion that interchanges two dierent elements i; j 2 N . From Lemma 3.1-(b) it is
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f(N; (W);p) = f(N;W ; (p)) for any p 2 [0; 1]n and so we have f(N; (W); t) =
f(N;W ; t). On the other hand, fi(N; (W);p) = fj(N;W ; (p)) so that

i(N; (W); t) = (1 t)fi(N; (W); t) = (1 t)fj(N;W ; (t)) = (1 t)fj(N;W ; t) =

j(N;W ; t): This proves that bi(N;W) = b(i)(N; (W)):
Finally, (S4) is an immediate consequence of Denition 2.1, Lemma 3.1-(a) and
Theorem 3.3-(A3). 
Other well{known measure of power is the Banzhaf index. It is known (see Owen
[28]) that, in a simple game (N;W), this index can be expressed in terms of the
MLE f by 	i(N;W) = fi(12 ; : : : ; 12). From Denition 2.1 it is clear that
	i(N;W) = 2 
i(N;W ; 1
2
);
where 1
2
= (1
2
; : : : ; 1
2
).
A generalization of the Banzhaf index for assessed simple games, denoted by ,
was proposed in [10], and it was proved that i(N;W ;p) = fi(N;W ;p). Thus, if
pi 6= 1 then, from Denition 2.1, we have
i(N;W ;p) = (1  pi) 1
i(N;W ;p)
In addition, the Banzhaf index is a particular case of a family of semivalues, known
as binomial semivalues, 	pi (N;W) = fi(p; : : : ; p) for every p 2 [0; 1], introduced
in [12]. From Denition 2.1, if p 6= 1 we can write
	pi (N;W) = (1  p) 1
i(N;W ; p);
with p = (p; : : : ; p).
5 Conclusion
The measure 
 evaluates the potential strategic importance of each voter in order
to improve in the desired direction the nal decision. This measure multiplies the
partial derivative of the MLE of the simple game by a term capturing the degree
to which an outsider interested in passage of a proposal could still increase a given
voter's acceptance probability. Voters for which 
 is maximum are those that pro-
duce a greater change in the probability to pass the proposal when they ensure their
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vote for it. Bribes might be oered to these voters. The axiomatization of this
measure introduced in this paper oers an easy way to characterize it. Of course
the set of axioms presented is not the only one, and nding another set of axioms
is an open problem.
Dierent power measures in assessed simple games (N;W ;p) have been dened
intending to measure dierent aspects of power. It is an interesting problem to
study the ordinal equivalence of these measures as was done in previous works for
the classical Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices in the more restricted context
(N;W), see e.g. [3], [16] and [21] for successive wider results on simple games. It
also deserves interest the extension of these measures for multichoice games or for
games with a coalition structure, see e.g. [4], [1], or modications of them as was
done for semivalues in [13]. The study of the ordinal equivalence of these extended
measures, topics which have [37] and [30] as seminal works, would also merit an
special attention.
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